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Creating Greener Citizens: Political Liberalism and a Robust 
Environmental Education.1  
 
 
 
Proponents of environmentalist views often urge the teaching of such views and the inculcation 
of ‘green’ values within the educational curriculum of schools as a key component of achieving 
their ends. Such radical transformation of the attitudes, lifestyles, and preferences of individuals 
that is often said to be required to solve major environmental problems cannot be achieved 
without directing educational institutions to inculcate an environmentalist ethic. 
 
It might seem that modern versions of political morality that refuse to take a stance on 
controversial questions – religious, ethical, philosophical – or eschew appeal to perfectionist 
doctrines, are beset by a particularly acute difficulty in this regard. To the extent that 
environmentalist views embody claims about ethical matters such as how individuals should live 
their lives, they fall foul of this version of political morality. For example, the most developed 
such account – Rawlsian political liberalism – seeks to articulate conceptions of justice and 
legitimacy that can gain the support of an overlapping consensus of the many reasonable 
comprehensive ethical, philosophical, and religious doctrines that inevitably exist within a liberal 
democratic society. It aims to do so, without itself taking an ethical, philosophical, or religious 
position, or taking a stand with regard to the truth or falsity of any such doctrine. Political 
liberalism follows this path so as not to prejudice the affirmation of a conception of justice by 
ethically, philosophically, or religiously reasonable views, but rather to generate wide and stable 
support.2 Whilst political liberalism mandates a minimalist role for children’s education – one 
that prepares children for citizenship in a society of free and equal citizens with the capacity to 
form, revise, and pursue their own conception of the good and the ability to live by principles of 
justice appropriate for such a society – the fostering of these ‘political virtues’ does not extend to 
the teaching of wider ethical doctrines. Green ideals, like Muslim or Christian ideals, are too 
controversial to be part of the compulsory curriculum in such a society. 
 
                                                
1 [Omitted]  
2 For the sake of simplicity, henceforth I use ‘ethical ideal’ or ‘ethical doctrine’ to cover ethical, philosophical, or 
religious views. 
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This article evaluates the resources available to political liberalism to respond to the challenge of 
bringing the teaching of green values and virtues within the national curriculum. Environmental 
issues are becoming ever more prominent and important political issues. The alleged 
incompatibility of environmental education and considerations of basic justice strikes many as a 
serious flaw in any view of political morality; one that detracts from its plausibility. Rather than 
rejecting political liberalism in favour of an environmentalist or ecological framework, I will seek 
a reconciliation of the two.3 The extension of existing, and well worked out conceptions of 
justice, to other areas of political concern bestows credence in both directions: political liberalism 
looks even more plausible and robust because it covers more cases of moral concern, and 
environmentalism cements its claim to be a critical question capable of being dealt with as part of 
the most highly respected and plausible view of justice. 
 
More specifically, I will argue that environmental concerns differ in morally important ways from 
other ethical, philosophical, and religious views that are typically off-limits to political liberalism. 
Much that passes as green ideals are not simply a conception of the good life in the manner that 
religious views, for example, are. Rather, many environmental goods are crucial to the realisation 
of socioeconomic justice and therefore escape the requirement of state neutrality on endorsing 
the truth or importance of their role. A minimal political liberal education includes teaching 
about justice-based concerns as part of a compulsory national curriculum. 
 
This paper has the following format. Section I outlines the apparent conflict between 
environmentalism and the model of education mandated by political liberalism. As well as 
viewing the broad contours of political liberalism, I consider (and reject) three possible responses 
to this conflict, including Bell’s recent (2004) innovative attempt to reconcile political liberal 
education and environmental virtues. Section II draws and elaborates a crucial distinction 
between issues of the good and issues of socioeconomic justice. Political liberalism requires 
neutrality only between matters of the former kind. Many environmental goods (and the values 
that attach to them) that are ordinarily thought to be comprehensive ideals are, I argue, part of 
the requirements of basic socioeconomic justice. Political liberalism need not be neutral in 
educational terms on such matters. Section III expands upon environmental goods as 
socioeconomic goods by illustrating how they are crucial to realising justice, and fleshes out how 
                                                
3 Rejection of political liberalism (or any other liberal view) is, of course, a serious option, but not one that I 
consider here (for this see e.g., Nussbaum 2006). Nor, it should be noted, do I offer any detailed or concerted 
defence of political liberalism per se. Rather, I take political liberalism largely as correct, and (after laying out its 
rough contours) see where this leads us, by extension, in terms of environmentalist concerns. 
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this could be incorporated as part of a compulsory political liberal national curriculum. It also 
considers what would be left out (in terms of the concerns of environmentalists) and how 
significant this might be. Section IV concludes. 
 
I   
Rawlsian political liberalism takes as its starting point the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ (Rawls 
1996, pp.63-66). A diversity of ethical, philosophical, religious and other ‘comprehensive’ 
doctrines is an inevitable and permanent outcome of democracy where the basic rights and 
liberties of free institutions obtain; pluralism is the result of the exercise of practical reason 
within the framework of free institutions (Rawls 1996, pp.36-37). 
 
Reasonable pluralism refers, that is, to a multitude of different, yet reasonable, religious 
doctrines. In Rawls’s conception reasonableness is characterised by two moral virtues. First, 
reasonable people are ‘ready to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided 
others do’, and to achieve a system of social cooperation guided by principles of justice that are 
acceptable to every reasonable person (Rawls 1996, pp.54). Second, it involves ‘the willingness to 
recognise the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason 
in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.’ (Rawls 1996, 
p.54). This is a notion that characterises the nature of people’s beliefs. In this sense, one’s view is 
reasonable if one possesses the requisite power of theoretical and practical reason, and one’s 
beliefs are the product of one’s employment of these powers under conditions of freedom. 
These powers consist in the ability to weigh evidence appropriately, draw inferences, balance 
competing considerations, and so on. Rawls argues that humans are beset by various ‘burdens of 
judgment’ such that the exercise of our theoretical, practical, and moral faculties under 
conditions of freedom inevitably gives rise to a plurality of comprehensive doctrines. Moreover, 
because this pluralism is a product of the free activity of persons, even those who are adept at 
deliberating about ethical, religious, and philosophical matters, we should regard it as a 
permanent feature of free democratic societies, rather than a product of ignorance or prejudice 
that may disappear or be overcome. 
 
Rawls’s conception of legitimacy purports to identify the conditions under which legal and 
political institutions have de jure authority understood as the (Hohfeldian) power to direct 
citizens’ lives through binding laws and the right to enforce the law through the penal system. A 
well-known aspect of Rawls’s view is that political institutions have legitimate authority if they 
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are guided by a constitution that is responsive to ideas and principles acceptable to ‘free and 
equal’ citizens who are stipulated as being reasonable. In other words, the justification of political 
power must be conducted in terms that do not gainsay the assumptions, ideals, or conclusions of 
any wide variety of ethical or religious conceptions that are held by reasonable citizens. We must, 
Rawls insists, elaborate ‘political’ conceptions of social cooperation that draw on the democratic 
ideals of freedom and equality, but which stand free of ethical, philosophical, or religious claims 
(‘comprehensive’ claims) that are disputed by reasonable citizens. The aim is to create an 
‘overlapping consensus’ of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that support this conception of 
justice. This distinctly ‘political’ liberalism is to be distinguished from the ‘comprehensive’ 
liberalisms of Mill, or Kant, which provide synoptic world-views aimed at dealing with an array 
of issues, including (but not limited to) the correct principles of justice, but which remain 
controversial because they depend upon conceptions of the good that are not widely shared in 
democratic societies, such as Mill’s account that rests on individuality, or Kant’s account of 
moral autonomy. 
 
Within this political liberal framework, the education of children plays an important, though 
strictly limited function. According to Rawls (in a discussion that occurs in the context of 
religious groups), this education will include: 
 
such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for 
example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that 
apostasy is not a legal crime, all this is to ensure that their continued membership 
when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or 
fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist. Moreover, their education 
should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of a society and 
enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so 
that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with 
the rest of society (Rawls 1996, p.199. See also Rawls 2001, p.156). 
 
As Rawls elaborates in a later restatement, this education should promote respect for each other 
as equals as part of a capacity for a ‘sense of justice’, as well as inculcating the virtues of 
reasonableness, a sense of fairness, and a spirit of compromise (Rawls 2001, p.116. See also Bell 
2004, p.39). What, exactly, these things might unpack to mean is the focus of the last section of 
this piece. Nevertheless, we should note that these are necessary components of a political liberal 
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educational curriculum. Whilst these aspects are compulsory, it does not follow that these are the 
only things that can be taught. Beyond these aspects, political liberalism leaves room for families, 
communities, and schools to determine the content of how their children are educated. This is 
likely to vary significantly across schools, as we see with schools that promote particular religious 
faiths, or philosophical positions, or even an environmentalist ethic. 
 
Whilst there is, perhaps, space for the inclusion of environmental concerns in the classroom, this 
is likely to jar considerably with defenders of environmentalism who view mechanisms for 
changing attitudes, preferences, and behaviours as necessary for resolving serious ecological 
problems (with potentially catastrophic consequences) not as a voluntarily adopted educational 
ethi for some schools – as Catholicism or Islam might be adopted as a wider educational aim – 
but as a core mandatory component of education for every school child. 
 
On the face of things, political liberalism and environmentalism are radically incompatible (see 
Dobson 2001, p.vii for examples). The latter is ordinarily conceived of as a world view, a 
conception of the good; the very thing that political liberalism eschews appeal to, and attempts 
to steer a neutral path between. Although it comes in many forms, at its core, environmentalism 
is committed to the improvement of the health of the environment and its repair and 
conservation. In particular, this includes concerns of nonhuman entities and elements, and the 
proper relationship or balance between human life and the various natural systems upon which it 
depends. Typically, defences of these ‘green’ values go beyond the minimalism of political 
liberalism and constitute a more ‘comprehensive’ or perfectionist political doctrine – one that 
affirms a certain picture of what the good life consists of. Views vary, of course, but the 
trajectory away from political liberalism’s eschewing of such commitments is, prima facie, clear. 
 
This has implications for education, and these implications are not modest. The thoroughgoing 
reform of values such aims would require would necessitate educational mechanisms for 
attempting to create green citizens with the knowledge and skills to protect the environment, or 
save the Earth, from the deleterious effects of the kinds of processes liberalism is often thought 
to engender. This would include such things as the capacities to make environmentally aware 
decisions, the capacity to understand scientific evidence, and to bring political, economic, and 
deliberative resources to bear on specific issues. It would require a less individualistic or 
atomistic ethos than is ordinarily considered to be a mainstay of liberal conceptions of political 
morality. As the UNESCO report from the 1977 Intergovernmental Conference on 
6 
 
Environmental Education – which Bell cites in his recent consideration of this question – states, 
environmental education must be both universal, comprehensive, and holistic (UNESCO 1979, 
pp.12-14). That is, it must apply to all children and all school curricula everywhere; it must cover 
the full range of environmental issues that threaten the planet and life on it; and it must draw in 
many educational disciplines, from sciences to social sciences, arts, and humanities. The aim is 
not simply to transmit the right attitudes, but to develop the capacity of children to actively think 
in a pro-environmentalist manner for themselves; to give them exposure to issues, and the 
necessary critical tools and experiential resources to work through the issues in a sophisticated 
manner, as well as to extrapolate to new issues as they arise. If the public are to be guardians of 
the environment, then they will require the proper educational background to later enact the 
policies necessary to save the planet. As Bell writes: 
 
If the aim is to protect the environment by creating new generations of citizens, 
who are ‘greener’ than their parents and grandparents, it will not be enough to 
make environmental education an entitlement. It is only by making it compulsory 
that we can ensure that ‘everyone becomes environmentally conscious through 
proper environmental education’. Environmental education must be ‘an essential 
part of every pupil’s curriculum’ (Bell 2004, p.43, citing Palmer and Neal 1994, 
pp.14 and 28 respectively. Footnote omitted). 
 
I wish to elaborate and defend the claim that political liberalism and a serious environmentalism 
are, contrary to first appearances, in large part compatible. Not all environmentalist concerns or 
educational aspirations are realisable under political liberalism, but the most central ones – more 
so than rival attempts at reconciliation allow – are. Several possibilities or routes to achieving this 
reconciliation are possible. I will give these brief consideration, and reasons that count against 
them, before moving to the positive argument in the next section. 
 
One tactic, presented by (amongst others) Baxter (2000; 2005; 2006), is to broaden the 
foundations of anti-perfectionist versions of political morality to include nonhuman entities as 
part of the ‘community’ of entities to whom justice is owed. This solution seeks to guarantee the 
inclusion of certain ecological aspects in any outcomes agreed to in the initial contractualist 
framework that stands at the root of views such as political liberalism by including parties with 
those interest as part of the original contract. Whilst for Rawls the contracting parties are 
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humans, Baxter adds much of nonhuman nature whose interests (like those of other ‘inarticulate’ 
groups such as the severely disables) are represented by proxy. 
 
Such a view has the ability (if correct) of building a very strong ecological position into the 
political liberal-type framework. In terms of education it would likely mandate considerable and 
radical revision of a national curriculum to include a wide range of activities and learning about 
the protection of entities that are considered fellow citizens in a common project. 
 
I wish to set this position aside, for I have argued against it at length elsewhere (*** self 
reference deleted ***). We need only note that it does not provide an answer to our current 
predicament because it undermines the neutrality of political liberalism. Admitting nonhuman 
entities into the community of justice may be possible, but it does so at the cost of creating two 
competing versions of political liberalism. Political liberalism was supposed to provide a neutral 
framework for steering between different comprehensive conceptions of the good, and an 
agreed set of procedures that allowed wider policy questions outside of matters of basic justice to 
be resolved fairly. As Baxter acknowledges, the upshot of his argument is now two versions of a 
neutralist framework – one with nonhuman entities included, one with only human entities 
included – and no agreed upon criteria for choosing which is correct (Baxter 2000, p.62). 
Incorporating ecological concerns in this way has simply pushed the issue back one level of 
philosophical abstraction. It does not solve the problem so much as deepen it. 
 
A second response – one touched upon by Bell (2004, p.40) – is one that attempts to ‘avoid’ the 
problem by suggesting that the essential curriculum mandated by political liberalism is more 
expansive than it appears at first sight, and is likely to include a good deal of the 
environmentalist’s concerns and points. Bell suggests this is inadequate because it implies the 
national curriculum would be almost wholly occupied with the task of creating ‘good citizens’ 
and this curriculum would be compulsory across all schools. ‘Accepting this ‘solution’ seems to 
undermine the idea of political liberalism as a “module, an essential constituent part, that fits into 
and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society 
regulated by [the principles of political liberalism]”.’ (Bell 2004, p.40, quoting Rawls 1993, p.12. 
Interpolation in Bell). 
 
Bell’s dismissal of this option is too quick. It does not follow that a wider understanding of the 
role of a political liberal education will eat up the entire national curriculum. I will take this up in 
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the next section where I argue that educating about justice is part of the political liberal position 
on education, and many environmental concerns and ideals form part of any acceptable 
conception of socioeconomic justice. Before proceeding, I wish to consider one final option 
which is endorsed by Bell in his recent exploration of this question (2004). 
 
Rawls’s statement about education in a political liberal society includes the encouraging of the 
‘political virtues’ so that citizens may play a fully cooperative role in their society (Rawls 1996, 
p.199). Bell argues that these political virtues are likely to include certain environmentalist 
virtues, though only a limited amount. Noting that Rawls’s account requires a ‘just savings 
principle’ to meet the requirements of justice to future generations in order to realise and 
preserve a just society, Bell suggests that this will include a conception of ‘sustainability’ (Rawls 
1999, p.257; Bell 2004, p.46). Admittedly, this may not be a particularly ‘green’ conception of 
sustainability or sustainable development, because Rawls’s conception is not committed to 
anything so specific, but might well be compatible with it. Wissenberg’s (1998) infamous ‘global 
Manhattan’ – rather than a world of open green spaces – may be a plausible option for satisfying 
the Rawlsian-based notion of sustainability for achieving a decent standard of living through 
social cooperation within a society that exists across generations. 
 
What sustainability will require is, therefore, to be determined by citizens through informed 
discussion. Such informed discussion is predicated upon an education sufficient to allow serious 
contemplation and deliberation about such matters. ‘In addition to promoting “political virtues”, 
which are designed to ensure intra-generational justice, the [political liberal] curriculum should 
aim to promote “sustainability virtues”, which are designed to ensure inter-generational justice.’ 
(Bell 2004, p.47). And, ‘[i]n short, the [political liberal] curriculum should aim to promote a 
positive attitude toward “sustainability” and a basic understanding of the environmental and 
social science frameworks that citizens need to participate in “sustainability” decisions.’ (Bell 
2004, p.47). 
 
Whilst this response is promising in terms of widening the understanding of political virtues to 
include a more environmental slant, it expands it in the wrong direction, and it leaves too much 
out that might otherwise be included. Relying on the just savings principle raises the 
controversial issue of Rawls’s position on intergenerational justice, and the difficulties this 
conception brings. In the next section I will argue that there are more straightforward parts of 
Rawls’s conception of intra-generational justice that do in fact cover many environmental 
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concerns and virtues. Moreover, this solution leaves the vast majority of environmental issues to 
be settled by democratic procedures, and the wider content of the educational curriculum to be 
determined by the preferences of the society. If environmental concerns are to be addressed by 
public policy or ‘green ideals’ are to form part of children’s education, then (beyond the 
sustainability virtues) this is permissible if enough citizens can be convinced of their value. In 
this sense, green ideals remain a conception of the good, the merits of which are to be debated 
and haggled over in the political process by an informed citizenry. If enough people can be 
convinced – as they may be convinced by the worth of other features of other conceptions of 
the good such as prayers in schools – then these ideals may permissibly be instituted. If not, not. 
 
Proponents of environmental justice are likely to be dissatisfied with this conclusion. The point 
is that environmental issues are so fundamental to human (and other) life and flourishing, that 
they are matters of justice, and not simply preferences to be argued over in public debate, to be 
adopted or not adopted as a society sees fit. In this they differ from conceptions of the good, 
such as religious doctrines. Much of the environmentalist position is conceived of by its 
defenders as matters of justice, not of the good. It is to a defence of this position that I now 
turn. 
 
II  
In the face of reasonable pluralism, Rawlsian political liberalism defends an anti-perfectionist 
position, rather than affirming the truth or falsity of any particular view or views of the good. By 
contrast, however, Rawls also defends a non-neutral position with regard to socioeconomic 
matters of justice.4 Indeed, Rawls defends a non-neutral and rather specific set of socioeconomic 
resources – his ‘primary social goods’ – as a requirement of justice. These goods include not only 
rights and liberties (to freedom of speech, association, and so forth), but to opportunities (to 
positions of advantage), and to a specific distribution of wealth and income that arises from the 
differential positions of advantage and the employment of talents. Anti-perfectionism is strictly 
limited to certain areas (questions of the good), and is not intended to apply across the board 
(questions of how resources ought to be distributed). Issues of fair resource division are not 
something to be argued over within democratic institutions on the basis of deliberation or 
preferences. Rawls’s second principle of justice, which is intended to shape the basic structure of 
society on such matters, makes this clear:  
 
                                                
4 Whether this asymmetrical treatments of justice and the good is sustainable is the subject of the next section. 
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Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to 
the benefit of the least advantaged, [the Difference Principle] and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity 
[the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle] (Rawls 1971, p.302). 
 
The difference principle prioritises the position of the least advantaged in the distribution of 
particular resources (wealth and income) and provides a guarantee of a level of these resources 
that will enable individuals to make full use of their rights, liberties, and opportunities in the 
pursuit of their particular conception of the good (whatever that turns out to be). Something like 
the difference principle is, according to Rawls, a necessary component of any reasonable 
conception of justice. 
 
It is these resources – primary social goods – and their governing principles of distribution – 
Rawls’s principles of justice – that provides the point of embarkation for my argument that a 
wide range of environmental goods and concerns can be included within the framework of basic 
justice, rather than treated as matters of the good. I will argue that environmental goods, that is, 
are more appropriately conceived in the same manner as Rawls’s other primary goods, or as 
goods that contribute to them. 
 
Rawls describes primary social goods as those resources that, whatever else we need in life, we 
need these in order to frame, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. The link between 
certain environmental goods and the primary goods is so obvious in cases such as breathable air 
that their provision is beyond question. Without breathable air the primary goods of rights, 
liberties, opportunities, and so forth would be pointless. Yet, many environmental goods will 
impact on liberties, opportunities, and other resources guaranteed by the basic principles of 
justice in a similar manner. Polluted rivers impact upon the value of land. Removal of 
woodlands, open countryside, clean water, unpolluted seas, particular species of animals and 
insects, can seriously curtail the liberties and opportunities of citizens. The existence of such 
liberties and opportunities is premised upon the existence of natural resources. Without them, 
citizens cannot make effective use of them. The absence of environmental goods and natural 
resources essential to the effective use of rights and liberties is akin to the individual who 
possesses the formal right to go to the opera, but who lacks the financial means to ever afford a 
ticket; it is a hollow right. 
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The analogous case here is healthcare. An adequate level of health is necessary for our normal 
social functioning or protecting our opportunities. To the extent that we are unhealthy, our 
opportunities (or normal functioning) are impaired. Meeting health needs helps protect these 
opportunities. Because justice requires the protection of opportunities and liberties, then meeting 
healthcare needs takes on special importance. Healthcare, that is, is a special kind of good 
(Daniels 2008, pp.29-78). This does not mean that we should simply add healthcare to the list of 
primary goods. Instead, healthcare can be thought of as a necessary component for the 
realization of fair equality of opportunity under the second principle of justice (see Daniels 2008, 
pp.56-8). In a similar manner the difference principle can be seen as providing a fair distribution 
of certain all-purpose means for meeting the needs of food, clothing, shelter, and so forth, rather 
than as seeing them as primary goods themselves (Daniels 2008, p.57). The question is, instead, 
how extensive is the list of environmental goods that are required to give fair value to the rights 
that are central to social justice? 
 
Maintaining a decent environment will be central to leading the decent lives that the goods 
provided as a matter of justice are intended to allow us to achieve. Securing and protecting areas 
of natural beauty, saving endangered species and protecting others, purifying our air and water, 
maintaining a delicately balanced ecosystem with all its essential parts, all of these and more are 
essential to this task. Because of the degree of interconnectedness of these various aspects (and 
our ignorance of how they fit together exactly), many will require the protection of other aspects. 
Purifying air and water to a sufficient level (and then maintaining it) is, upon closer inspection, 
an incredibly multifaceted task that extends from stemming carbon emissions, through 
preventing the destruction of the rain forests, to maintaining the delicate balance of flora and 
fauna in the oceans. This is often overlooked when simply talking of limiting pollution and 
purifying air as a component of basic justice. Once we begin to view environmental goods as 
crucial to securing justice, then many crucial parts of our ecosystem will require protection as 
part of this aim (Barry 2005, pp.251-60). As Bell writes: ‘If providing the opportunity to 
experience quality environments is an effective and efficient means of maintaining and restoring 
the “minimum essential capacities for being [a] normal and fully cooperating [member] of 
society,” a Rawlsian state has reason to devote resources to it.’ (Bell 2004b, pp.303-4, quoting 
Rawls 2001, pp.171-2). Maximising the position of the worst-off will necessarily include devoting 
resources to other projects than just distributing income to individuals. Open green spaces, 
access to countryside and coastline are crucial to the mental and physical well-being of the 
population, and are an integral part of any policy package. What it takes to provide these things 
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will include a chain of interconnected components. Similarly, a sufficient social minimum should 
secure a solution to food and fuel poverty that are often central environmental concerns, as well 
as components that regulate building and transport industries. 
 
Similarly, current research consistently shows that the vast majority of environmental pollutants 
produced by industry are produced in the most socially and economically deprived areas (see 
Stephens et al 2001). ‘[W]ithout clean air many people will suffer debilitating respiratory illnesses 
that prevent them from engaging in “mutually beneficial social cooperation” (e.g., working) and 
from pursuing their conception of the good.’ (Bell 2004b, pp.298-9). As we have seen, even 
meeting these basic requirements is an extensive task, requiring far-reaching policies and actions. 
The preservation of various species of animals and plants, the reduction of various activities, are 
all likely to be included. Attaining clean air requires not simply the reduction of emissions but the 
preservation of parts of the ecosystem – such as various strains of plankton and algae in the seas 
– that absorb CO2, and various fish and mammals for which these form vital foodstuffs and 
which manage the stocks of these organisms. 
 
If I am somewhere near correct in this – that many environmental goods and concerns are 
rightly seen as crucial to the provision of the all-purpose means (primary goods) for pursuing a 
conception of the good that are guaranteed as part of an acceptable conception of justice within 
Rawlsian political liberalism – then this will have equally reformatory consequences for what can 
be taught in schools as part of a basic political liberal curriculum. As well as the abilities of 
critical thinking and sensitivity to balancing evidence and so forth, the political values will also 
include teaching and learning about how the environment impacts upon the rights, liberties, and 
opportunities that citizens are guaranteed within political liberal society. The link between such 
aspects and reciprocity and the ‘fair terms of social cooperation’ can also be made explicit. These 
aspects are, moreover, compulsory as part of the basic curriculum of teaching about justice, 
rather than an optional part outside of the basic political liberal national curriculum. The only 
question this raises is whether teaching about justice in this way is compatible with Rawls’s 
statement about education. I consider this – along with other criticisms – in the next section. 
 
III  
I have argued that many aspects of environmental justice are more appropriately considered as 
matters pertaining to or impinging upon the provision of primary goods, rather than questions of 
the good life. As such, they are not matters that the political liberal society need remain neutral 
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over. An educational curriculum within such a society must include knowledge of such features 
within its remit. In this, many environmental view and the goods that they endorse will be 
markedly different in qualitative terms than, say, religious views. The latter makes claims about 
the good life, whilst the former make a different type of claim: that certain goods are essential for 
pursuing a conception of the good, whatever that turns out to be. We might disagree over the 
exact nature of these goods, but these are disagreements about justice, not the good. This raises 
two immediate questions, or potential objections. I turn now to consider these. 
 
The first issue concerns the nature of disagreements over the good and disagreements over 
socioeconomic justice. Political liberalism, as we have seen, treats these two aspects 
asymmetrically: it proposes anti-perfectionism in the face of different views of the good, but a 
non-neutral set of principles in the case of the distribution of primary goods. The objection here 
is that this asymmetrical stance is unsustainable. To see the power of this objection, recall that 
Rawls uses the notion of the burdens of judgment – which is one component (along with 
reciprocity) of his notion of reasonableness – to explain the existence of a plurality of 
comprehensive doctrines within free liberal-democratic societies, and to justify an anti-
perfectionist stance. Yet, if the burdens of judgment explain disagreement about the good, then 
it would seem likely that they also explain disagreement about distributive justice (Caney 1999; 
Clayton 1999). Disagreement is not somehow absent from questions of distributive justice. 
Indeed, certain disagreements about justice seem as easily explicable in terms of the burdens as 
do disagreements about the good. For instance, divergent views about the appropriate level (if 
any) of economic redistribution, or about the minimum wage, or about the permissibility of the 
death penalty, or about an appropriate level of state-funded healthcare, seem as easily explained 
by appeal to the criteria of the burdens as do such things as the legitimacy of abortion, Sunday 
Trading laws, fox hunting, or the place of the arts in a worthwhile life (Caney 1999, pp.22-23).5 
This leaves me, then, with the following dilemma:  
 
Either: 
(1) We admit that reasonable disagreement applies to questions of justice and retract a 
partisan commitment to any principles of (re)distribution as a component part of a just 
framework; 
                                                
5 This does not imply that all questions of justice are subject to such disagreement. There may be agreement over 
some issues. There is, for example, remarkable consensus over the importance of the Rule of Law. But, this does 
not remove the complaint that some issues of justice are the subject of widespread disagreement, that they do not 
differ from disagreement over questions of the good in this respect, and both fit the model of explanation offered 
by the burdens of judgment. 
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Or: 
(2) We deny that questions of justice are subject to reasonable disagreement and accept that 
this also holds for questions about the good. 
 
Either horn of the dilemma would appear to undermine political liberalism as outlined here. 
Grasping the first horn would mean that the best we could hope for would be some kind of 
proceduralist framework for deciding issues of socioeconomic justice. This type of view is 
defended by neutralists such as Barry (1995), and would shrink the values and virtues to be 
compulsorily taught in schools to a bare minimum. The aim would simply be to establish a 
political framework in which people could collectively determine laws and policies – via free 
political debate – on all questions of the good, distributive justice, and (as part of either) 
environmental issues. What principles or policies would be adopted would depend upon the 
ability of their proponents to convince their fellow citizens of their merits. 
 
Grasping the second horn would mean retaining a commitment to a particular set of principles 
of justice at the cost of being pushed towards perfectionism. That is, it might no longer be 
possible to rule out the applicability of the burdens to certain claims about the good. The state 
would have to give up its stance of neutrality in certain areas and endorse a particular conception 
of the good. 
 
Such an objection, however, misunderstands the true nature of political liberalism, because it 
fails to grasp the role that reasonableness plays in the construction of the political liberal view. 
The reason it is possible to escape the proposed dilemma and maintain the asymmetrical position 
with regard to justice and the good that the position defended herein depends upon is because it 
is only reasonable views to which the political liberal framework must be acceptable, and not to all 
views. This is a crucial, yet oft-neglected distinction. As we saw at the outset, a necessary 
condition of the acceptability of a conception of justice is that it fulfills the reciprocity 
requirement (as one of the two component parts of reasonableness). Reasonable citizens are 
reciprocal in that they are ‘ready to propose fair terms of social cooperation and to abide by 
them provided other do’ (Rawls 1993, p.54). In distributive terms, this means that we must treat 
the goods produced by social cooperation as the legitimate subject of distributive principles 
(Rawls 1996, p.lviii). This is required by Rawls’s earlier claim that all citizens require certain all-
purpose means to make use of the rights, liberties and opportunities afforded them by his first 
principle of justice (Rawls 1996, p.xlviii). Without such resources, these liberties and 
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opportunities are empty, for the realization of their full worth is tied to the level of resources that 
the individuals holding them have. Rawls lists a few concrete items that, as a minimum, this 
would require: the public financing of elections, equality of opportunity, a decent distribution of 
income, society to act as the employer of last resort, and basic healthcare for all citizens (Rawls 
1996, pp.lviii-lix). To this, I have argued, we should add a swathe of environmental goods that 
are prerequisites for many of the items Rawls lists. 
 
The reciprocity requirement means that views such as Nozick’s (1978) libertarianism, for 
example, fails to be reasonable in the appropriate sense because it denies certain all-purpose 
resources as necessarily accompanying liberties in order that people can make full use of them, 
and claims instead that the unfettered market is the appropriate mechanism for setting the 
baseline distribution of such resources. Whilst Nozick’s view does not depend on any particular 
conception of the good – his claims about self-ownership and private property rest on a 
conception of what we may legitimately do (or not do) to one another, not on a conception of 
what makes life valuable – and is a political conception in that sense, it is not a liberal conception 
because it fails to meet the reciprocity criterion. Liberal conceptions, according to Rawls, are 
uniquely placed to meet the requirements of reciprocity because only such conceptions display a 
sufficient level of concern for the advantage of every individual (see Rawls 1996: lviii). 
 The response here, then, is not to deny the existence of disagreement about distributive 
justice, but to point to the fact that most actual disagreement is unreasonable, and thereby 
irrelevant. That is, the scope of disagreement about distributive justice is significantly narrowed 
once it is recognised that it is only disagreement between reasonable views that is of importance. 
Reasonable disagreement will occur (albeit amongst a narrower range of views) over which 
principle best fulfils the reciprocity requirement. To show a sufficient level of concern for the 
advantage of every individual such a principle must be, to some extent, egalitarian in nature. 
Within the Rawlsian theory the difference principle is one possible principle from a set of such 
principles. Moreover, Rawls believes it to be the most appropriate principle for the task of 
fulfilling the reciprocity requirement (Rawls 1996, p.xlix; Quong 2011, pp.204-12). 
 
Drawing out this dilemma and response has also provided another means by which to indicate 
the profound consequences for education of the view I have outlined and defended. The aim of 
a political liberal education for citizenship – as encapsulated in Rawls’s statement of encouraging 
‘the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their 
relations with the rest of society’ (Rawls 1996, p.199) – must be to develop in citizens an 
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commitment to democratic deliberation that is constrained or framed by both the virtues of 
civility (a recognition of the burdens of judgment) and an understanding of the significant social 
and economic requirements of reciprocity (Clayton 2006, p.150). This will necessarily include an 
understanding of the place and role of environmental goods and requirements that contribute to 
those social and economic resources. ‘Just as children should be educated to abhor law and 
policy that discriminates on racial or sexual grounds, they should also be brought to appreciate 
the injustice of political ideologies that do not afford citizens the right kinds of concern or 
respect.’ (Clayton 2006, p.150). Libertarian views that fails to offer health, opportunity, wealth 
and income, is one case in point. Views that relegate crucial environmental resources to matters 
of mere preference is another. 
 
This answer to the dilemma, however, raises a second potential objection, to wit, that teaching 
about justice within the educational curriculum is not permitted because it undermines the 
standard of legitimacy upon which political liberalism replies. A version of this criticism is 
articulated by Brighouse (1998). Brighouse objects to the kind of model of civic education – the 
more expansive version – that I have been defending here; namely, one that seeks to shape the 
political motivations of individuals by, among other things, teaching about the content of what 
justice requires. Such a model goes beyond simply providing individuals with the skills to reflect 
rationally and critically on political matters, and to participate in the political process, should they 
choose to. At first it looked like Rawls’s model was the latter kind; I have argued it is closer to 
the former, especially when environmental justice is considered. 
 
Brighouse objects that shaping the political motivations of individuals via an education about 
justice undermines legitimacy because, by definition, legitimacy requires free, informed, and 
rational consent. Teaching about justice skews the outcome in favour of itself. It is hardly 
surprising that individuals ‘consent’ to a conception of justice they have already been 
indoctrinated into. This is hardly free and rational consent, the objection goes. To illustrate this, 
Brighouse gives two criteria by which legitimacy can be measured. The first is that political 
arrangements must be such that citizens would consent to them if they were reasonable, 
possessed of sufficient information, and capable of reasoning in a manner that was not overly 
self-interested. Brighouse’s worry here is that this hypothetical consent is too easily attained. 
Thus, he adds the second criterion, that there must also be actual consent given by the governed 
(and that this too must be free, rational, and informed). This rules out, it seems, the 
interpretation of political liberal education I have expounded, because teaching about justice is 
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construed as manipulative, and hence, not free. ‘If we carefully foster the virtues among those 
who are not yet able rationally to assess the legitimacy of the state itself, what basis do we have 
to think they would have freely supported it on the basis of their reason alone?’ (Brighouse 1998, 
p.723). 
 
Is this an adequate objection? I do not believe so. Two brief reasons will indicate why not.6 First, 
Brighouse’s claim that actual consent is the ‘usual’ criterion added to the standard of legitimacy 
(after hypothetical consent) is inaccurate if we interpret this to mean in the accounts of leading 
liberal theorists. Rawls, Dworkin, and Raz (to name a few) do not consider actual consent to be a 
requirement of legitimacy. Rawls relies upon his conception of a ‘natural duty of justice’ to 
generate consent (Rawls 1971, pp.114-117). Dworkin adopts a form of ‘associative duties’ to 
ground consent (1986). And Raz utilizes a mechanism to generate an obligation to obey the law 
where complying with a given law enables an individual to better act on her reason for actions 
than not complying with it (1988). Second, on a proper and plausible account of legitimacy it is 
not correct that hypothetical consent is too easily attained. An account that rests on stringent 
ideals of justice and democracy will place significant demands on political principles and 
institutions, not ones that are weak and easily met (see Clayton 2006, p.134). 
 
If this broad reply to the charge that justice-based concerns cannot be taught as part of a 
compulsory education for fear of undermining legitimacy is correct, then not only can important 
aspects of environmentalism be taught, but they must be. They must be, because they form a 
basic requirement of learning about the fair terms of social cooperation. 
 
Finally, I want to turn to consider in slightly more detail, exactly what can be taught under the 
rubric of environmental justice consistent with a political liberal educational curriculum, and 
what gets left out. It is inevitable that some things will get left out. Not everything that is of 
concern to environmentalism will be subsumable within the category of primary social goods; 
not every environmentalist concern with be a concern of justice. Some things will remain beyond 
justice; that is, matters that are more appropriately conceived of as part of a broader conception 
of the good. This is not necessarily regrettable. To say something is not a consideration of justice 
is not to say that it does not matter. It may well matter on other grounds, and it may well matter 
more. Indeed, it has been my purpose to argue that other attempts to reconcile environmental 
conceptions of justice and liberal – particularly political liberal – conceptions of political morality 
                                                
6 Here I follow the excellent discussion of this matter in Clayton 2006, pp.133-145. 
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include too little of the former, such that they are unappealing to environmentalists. The 
reconciliation I have defended here has sought to include a wider array – the proper array – of 
environmental goods, though not everything. 
 
Those aspects of environmentalism that are not properly part of the requirements of justice will 
be subject to decision-making via the democratic process. Citizens, that is, can attempt to 
convince their fellow citizens of the importance of their non-political values, and to assign public 
funds in that regard, via deliberation, debate, and voting. As Bell writes: ‘Liberal citizens are 
entitled to vote their ecocentric ideals and a liberal state may promote ecocentric policies that 
have been endorsed through the democratic process.’ (Bell 2006, p.215). Similarly, citizens might 
decide that schools would – either collectively or individually – be better teaching more about 
the environment and its worth, preservation, and care than what justice requires because, as a 
society they are convinced of its worth, just as some do with regard to such things as religious 
faiths. 
 
Identifying what should be included, however, is a tricky business. What is clear from our 
understanding of the environment and the scientific processes behind it, is that we still 
understand relatively little about its myriad causal mechanisms and their interrelatedness. The 
provision of a decent environment as a precondition to the effective realisation of other primary 
goods will cover many concerns, but it will also leave some outside. This is because the 
composition of what constitutes a decent or sufficient environment will be complex and may 
take many varied forms. Under one schema a particular species might be essential, under another 
it might not be. It is only a requirement of justice that such a decent environment be provided so 
as to facilitate the realisation of the other parts of the view. The specifics of how such a schema 
is to be fleshed out is not something that is set out directly by a conception of justice. Given the 
complexity of the environment, we may need to assume that many apparently unconnected 
aspects of the ecosystem play an integral part in maintaining a decent environment.  
 
A simple analogy helps. A basic duty of parenting is the duty to provide one’s child with a 
nutritious diet. I shall assume, for the sake of argument, that vegetarianism is not morally 
required. So long as the diet meets the basic criteria for being considered nutritious it does not 
matter what the component parts are. Thus, there is no particular reason to provide one’s child 
with chicken so long as the necessary nutrients that would be obtained from chicken (primarily 
protein) are obtained from other food sources (soya, milk, red meat, eggs, beans, and so forth). 
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How we flesh out the set of goods that comprises a nutritious diet is up to us as parents. 
However, given the various food groups and nutrients that are essential to a healthy diet, and the 
limited numbers of foods available, any adequate schema is likely to overlap significantly with 
any other. Similarly, how we flesh out the package of environmental goods that we need to lead 
decent lives is likely to vary, but whichever is endorsed it is likely to overlap significantly with any 
alternative. 
 
IV Conclusion  
My aim has been straightforward: to argue that a strong environmentalist ethic and the 
educational curriculum it is often thought to demand is, in large part, compatible with the very 
stringent requirements of a political liberal framework and the constraints it places upon civic 
education. I have aimed to achieve this reconciliation by arguing that environmental goods – and 
the values that surround them – are more accurately and appropriately conceived of as primary 
social goods, not belief systems. As such, they fall under the heading of socioeconomic justice, 
not conceptions of the good. Proponents of political liberalism need only endorse an anti-
perfectionist stance with regard to conceptions of the good. About questions of justice they can 
endorse a partisan view that promotes distributive schemes of environmental goods, and which 
can legitimately be taught in the classroom as part of a national curriculum with the aim of 
creating greener citizens. 
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